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Standfirst 22 
Why is there no consensual way of conducting Bayesian analyses? We present a 23 
summary of agreements and disagreements of the authors on several discussion points 24 
regarding Bayesian inference. We also provide a thinking guideline to assist researchers on 25 
conducting Bayesian inference in the social and behavioural sciences. 26 
  27 
Debates among Bayesians 28 
Despite its many advocates, Bayesian inference is currently employed by only a 29 
minority of social and behavioural scientists. One possible barrier is a lack of consensus on 30 
how best to conduct and report such analyses. Employing Bayesian methods involves making 31 
choices about prior distributions, likelihood functions, and robustness checks, as well as on 32 
how to present, visualize, and interpret the results (for a glossary of the main Bayesian 33 
statistical concepts see Box 1). Some researchers may find this wide range of choices too 34 
daunting to use Bayesian inference in their own study. This paper highlights the areas of 35 
agreement and the arguments behind disagreements, established on the back of a self-36 
questionnaire explained in detail in the Supplement. 37 
 38 
The overall message is that instead of following rituals
1,2
, researchers should 39 
understand the reasoning behind the different positions and make their choices on a case by 40 
case basis. To assist the reader in this task, we provide a summary of our views on seven 41 
discussion points in Bayesian inference, serving as an inspiration for a ‘thinking guideline’ as 42 
a guide towards conducting Bayesian inference in the social and behavioural sciences. 43 
  44 
Our paper attempts to highlight the degree of debate that persists around the topic and 45 
explains why there are no easy-to-implement heuristics on how to use Bayesian analyses. 46 
Information about the genesis of this project can be found in the Supplementary Information 47 
and on OSF (https://osf.io/6eqx5/). 48 
 49 
--- Insert Box 1 about here  --- 50 
 51 
 52 
Discussion Points 53 
 54 
1. When would you recommend using Bayesian parameter estimation and when Bayesian 55 
testing (i.e., Bayes factors)? Do you think there is a fundamental difference between the two? 56 
There are (mathematical) similarities between testing and estimation, although the two 57 
approaches often have different goals in practice. Bayesian testing is generally used to test 58 
whether an effect is present; in contrast estimation is used to assess the size/strength of the 59 
effect. A big difference between the two approaches lies in the nature of the (joint) prior 60 
distribution, which tends to be discontinuous for testing, but continuous for estimation. An 61 
argument to consider estimation more informative, especially when credible intervals are 62 
calculated, is that it provides information about the uncertainty of the estimated parameter(s). 63 
Bayes factors are generally considered suitable to assess evidence for or against competing 64 
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hypotheses (or models). Researchers tend to use estimation when they want to examine a 65 
single model or several models very similar to each other but testing when they examine (at 66 
least two) models that differ from each other. 67 
  68 
2. A. How should the prior distribution and likelihood function for Bayesian analyses be 69 
chosen? 70 
Typically, there is a lot more emphasis on the choice of prior than on the choice of 71 
likelihood in Bayesian inference, but it is just as important to use the right model -- 72 
instantiated by the likelihood function -- for the data. Some Bayesian statisticians favour 73 
subjective priors over objective/default/uninformative ones, because uninformative priors are 74 
unrealistic, or because every scientific endeavour begins with an (informed) choice of both 75 
prior and likelihood. Uninformative priors should be chosen when assessing evidence for 76 
certain parameter values, but informative priors should be chosen when assessing evidence 77 
for one model over another. When using informative priors, uninformative priors can serve a 78 
role in fitting baseline models for comparison. A slightly less wide-spread strategy is 79 
choosing priors and likelihoods iteratively, obtaining prior predictive distributions of the 80 
model, and checking whether they lead to plausible data patterns. For example, it can be 81 
valuable to choose a sceptic’s prior, a believer’s prior, and a personal prior, and compare the 82 
possibly diverging results to determine how much the obtained results are influenced by prior 83 
beliefs. 84 
  85 
2.B. When and how do you think robustness checks should be performed in Bayesian 86 
analyses? 87 
Robustness checks are performed to verify whether the obtained results are affected by for 88 
modest variations of the prior distribution but should also be used to verify the influence of 89 
the choice of the likelihood function on the obtained results. The main argument for the 90 
importance of performing robustness checks over reasonable variations in modelling choices 91 
is to increase confidence in the obtained results: ideally results should be reasonably 92 
unaffected by a researcher’s idiosyncratic choice of prior or likelihood function when 93 
reasonable alternatives exist. When performing robustness checks, it is crucial to determine 94 
first which modelling choices may impact the results and perform your checks accordingly. 95 
They are primarily important when working with non-informative, and therefore more 96 
arbitrary priors.  97 
  98 
3. What do you think about using point null hypotheses versus (small) interval hypotheses 99 
when testing within the Bayesian framework? 100 
First of all, it is important to consider if the research question is best served by testing 101 
rather than estimating. A researcher should consider what a practically relevant effect is 102 
before having seen the data and set up an interval test accordingly. There is some agreement 103 
regarding the practical usefulness of the point null as a model to reflect invariance, but the 104 
viewpoint is open to critique: In the end, it may not matter that much, it would be rare for a 105 
point null and a small interval around null to lead to practically different conclusions, since 106 
the point null is a useful model as an approximation of a near-zero interval. In some cases, 107 
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the parsimonious point null helps flag the need for more data in case a (much) more complex 108 
model is believed to be true. Ultimately, researchers should use whichever they are most 109 
interested in (or both, to test robustness). 110 
  111 
4. How would you recommend reporting Bayesian analysis results? 112 
Although there is no agreement on a necessary reporting format, there are some important 113 
markers that are considered helpful in assessing the evidence. These include the model and its 114 
assumptions, prior distributions, choice of likelihood and posterior, potential hypotheses to be 115 
evaluated, details about samples from the posterior
3
 when applicable, and robustness tests. It 116 
is helpful to report results in terms of competing and completely specified models. Providing 117 
figures that show estimates with uncertainty, accompanied by Bayes factors when applicable 118 
is important. 119 
  120 
5. How would you recommend visualizing the results of a Bayesian analysis on diagrams? 121 
For Bayesian estimation, it is good practice to plot posteriors of parameters as a measure 122 
of uncertainty in case of estimation. Unless it creates an information overload, marginal 123 
predictions of a model and observed data should be plotted together, so that readers can see 124 
how authors came to their conclusions. 125 
For Bayesian testing, plots can include information on whether the Bayes factor reaches a 126 
meaningful threshold to facilitate the reader in drawing conclusions. It may be unwise to 127 
standardize data visualization as no solution fits all purposes. 128 
  129 
6. How would you recommend interpreting Bayesian analysis results (with a robustness 130 
test)? 131 
There are good arguments why it may be better to focus on the scientific rather than on the 132 
statistical interpretation because it helps the reader understand what the results mean and 133 
what the uncertainties of the presented conclusions are. One helpful chain of interpretation 134 
would go from (modelling) assumptions to observed data to conclusions, possibly with a 135 
similar chain for an alternative (but plausible) set of assumptions. When interpreting Bayes 136 
factors, presenting them through the lens of betting, especially when accompanied by real-137 
world examples of odds (i.e., Team A is deemed three times more likely to win than Team B) 138 
may be a helpful way of providing an intuition of the meaning of a Bayes factor. The same 139 
holds for providing illustrative visualizations and ranges for your qualitative conclusions 140 
when interpreting results. 141 
  142 
7. A. Should we use Bayesian analysis for making decisions about the evidence? 143 
One option for making decisions involves using Bayes factors. As an example, consider a 144 
researcher who obtains a Bayes factor of 10 for the hypothesis that a new medicine against 145 
migraine reduces symptoms over the hypothesis that the new medicine does not reduce 146 
symptoms. Should this Bayes factor be used to make a decision (i.e., endorse the new 147 
medication, so that it can be sold by pharmacies)?  148 
Some Bayesian statisticians think we should, offering that Bayes factors are suitable to do 149 
so. This, however, requires reliance on related utilities as well as probabilities (see 150 
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supplementary materials for a concrete example). A second option involves doing Bayesian 151 
utility analysis based on the posterior from a single fitted model. Other Bayesian statisticians 152 
state that making decisions about the evidence is optional and perhaps better left to policy 153 
makers rather than researchers. This echoes similar debates among frequentists
4
. 154 
  155 
7. B. Would you recommend a decision threshold, an a priori sample size, or anything else? 156 
There are arguments speaking against decision thresholds, e.g., (1) the behaviour of Bayes 157 
factors for different kinds of hypotheses is insufficiently understood such that it may lead to 158 
arbitrary decision making, both about the fate of the manuscript that reports them and about 159 
the true state of the world; (2) the strength of evidence (and the number of data points) needs 160 
to be understood within the research context; (3) even the smallest study can contribute useful 161 
information; (4) basing a decision on decision thresholds alone does not incorporate utilities. 162 
One of us believes that standard decision thresholds are useful as a convention because it 163 
facilitates making a decision about the evidence (see previous question) and has been active 164 
in having journals implement them. Perhaps a compromise is to consider standard decision 165 
thresholds a useful heuristic for evaluating the statistical evidence, without using them as a 166 
basis for publishing papers.  167 
 168 
Questions to consider 169 
This list of discussion points shows some of the disagreement that exists on major 170 
discussion points, but also that differing opinions are supported by arguments. The bottom 171 
line, endorsed by all authors, is: Use common sense. To assist the reader in this task, we 172 
compiled a ‘thinking guideline’ (Box 2) which aims to orient the attention to the questions 173 
that should be considered when conducting Bayesian statistics. 174 
 175 
--- Insert Box 2 about here  --- 176 
   177 
To conduct statistical inference is to make choices, for Bayesian inference, this 178 
dilemma remains. We hope that the thinking guideline that we present here is able to guide 179 
some of the choices necessary for analysing work in the behavioural and social sciences and 180 
informs researchers of some of the opinions of those in the field. 181 
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Bayes factor 
The relative support provided by the data for one model over another model in the form of 
an odds ratio. 
Bayesian estimation 
Branch of Bayesian statistical inference in which (an) unknown population parameter(s) 
is/are estimated. 
Bayesian testing 
Branch of (Bayesian) statistical inference in which competing hypotheses are tested. 
Credible intervals 
A probabilistic interval that is believed to contain a given parameter.  
Likelihood 
The probability (density) of the data given a model for a particular (set of) parameter(s). 
Likelihood function 
A function of the parameters of a statistical model, given specific observed data. Consider, 
for instance, a coin with an unknown rate probability r of coming up heads on a single flip. 
For the specific data of two flips, each coming up heads {H, H}, the likelihood function of 
r is L(r|H,H) = Pr({(H,H)}|r) = r2. For instance, given these observed data, the likelihood of 
the specific value r = 0.6 is 0.62 = 0.36.  
Posterior (distribution) 
Used in Bayesian inference to quantify an updated state of belief about some hypotheses 
(such as parameter values) after observing data. 
Prior (distribution) 
Used in Bayesian inference to quantify a state of belief about some parameter values given 
a model before having observed any data. Typically represented as a probability 
distribution over different states of belief.  
Posterior model probability 
Used in Bayesian inference to quantify an updated state of belief about the plausibility of a 
given model after observing data. The ratio of prior model probabilities times the Bayes 
factor for these same models gives the ratio of posterior model probabilities. 
Prior model probability 
Used in Bayesian inference to quantify a state of belief about the plausibility of a given 
model without taking observed data into account. 
Robustness check 
Used in Bayesian inference to verify the extent to which the obtained results are affected by 
(typically modest) variations of prior distribution and/or likelihood function. 
 
 
Thinking Guideline for Bayesian Inference 
Questions to consider when conducting Bayesian statistics 
  
1. Why use Bayesian statistics? 
  
Possible reasons include: (1) given a model, the strength of evidence only depends on data that were actually 
observed; (2) the results do not depend on the intention of the researcher; (3) the evidence is quantified as 
relative for one model or hypothesis over another model or hypothesis; and (4) the possibility to include prior 
information or beliefs. 
 
For general introductions to Bayesian inference, see ref 5-8. 
  
2. Are you interested in estimation or testing? 
  
Conduct a test when a binary question of some kind needs to be answered (e.g., “Can people see into the 
future?”). In such cases, a particular parameter value, such as zero, often has a special status when testing. 
Estimate parameters, possibly after having conducted a test, when your main interest is about the extent of 
the effect (e.g., “Assuming that they can, what is their predictive accuracy?”)9,10 p 274,11 p 385. 
 
  
3. How will you choose the prior distribution and likelihood function for Bayesian analyses? 
  
If you have relevant prior information available, for example based on prior study results, incorporate this in 
your prior distribution12-15. If not, consider using a ‘default’ (testing), or uninformative (estimation) prior. 
When you have several plausible candidates for your likelihood function, perform model comparisons. 
  
 
4. How do you plan to demonstrate the robustness of your analysis? 
  
Examine whether similar results would be obtained for different, but plausible, choices for the prior 
distribution. Perform model comparison when one has different, but plausible, choices for the likelihood 
function. One can couple robustness checks to decision thresholds, to verify for what range of prior 
assumptions a certain decision would be taken. 
 
5. How do you plan to communicate your results? 
  
Think about whether your results are best communicated through descriptive (summary) statistics (when the 
results are easily presented in the main text), graphics (when a visualisation conveys the information better), 
or tables (when there is too much information to present in a figure)14. The choice should also be guided by 
the research topic, the intended audience, and the type of analysis. 
  
6. Whatever you do, at each choice and decision in your analysis, be prepared to answer the ‘why’ 
question! 
  
Statistical analyses are sequences of choices. Understanding the implications of these choices and carefully 
thinking about them on a case by case basis are the responsibility of the author. Step-by-step guidelines and 
rituals can never substitute statistical thinking. 
 
